OT Network Segmentation: Zones, Conduits and Industrial DMZ Explained
Industrial networks rarely become difficult to secure because there is only one vulnerable device. The larger problem is often how many systems can communicate with one another.
An engineering workstation may need to communicate with a PLC. A SCADA server may need to exchange information with controllers. A historian may need access to selected process data. A vendor may require controlled remote access for maintenance.
The security question is not whether these communications exist. It is whether each communication path is necessary, understood, controlled and appropriately protected.
This is where OT network segmentation becomes important.
What Is OT Network Segmentation?
OT network segmentation is the practice of dividing an industrial environment into separate network segments or security zones and controlling the communication between them.
The objective is to reduce unnecessary connectivity and limit how far an incident could move through the environment.
Segmentation can be implemented through different combinations of network architecture, firewalls, routers, switches, access control lists, industrial security devices, jump servers, data diodes and other enforcement mechanisms.
NIST recommends organizing OT components into levels, tiers or zones before applying isolation controls, while considering the effect of that organization on daily operations, safety and response capabilities.
Why Segmentation Matters in OT
An unsegmented network can create unnecessary trust between systems.
If an attacker compromises one system, broad connectivity can make it easier to discover and reach additional systems. A compromised enterprise workstation, for example, should not automatically provide a direct route toward critical control systems.
Segmentation creates additional boundaries that can restrict communication and provide points where traffic can be controlled and monitored.
CISA describes segmentation as a way to limit access to devices, data and applications and to separate and protect OT network layers so that industrial processes can continue to function as intended.
Segmentation Is Not the Same as Isolation
These terms are sometimes used interchangeably, but they describe different levels of connectivity.
Segmentation means dividing a network and controlling communication between segments. Isolation can imply a much stronger separation where communication is eliminated or extremely restricted.
Most industrial environments still require communication between different systems. The goal is therefore often controlled connectivity rather than simply disconnecting everything.
What Are OT Security Zones?
A security zone is a logical grouping of systems that share similar security requirements and trust characteristics.
The exact zones will depend on the organization’s process and architecture. There is no single zone structure that should be copied into every plant.
A simplified industrial architecture may contain:
- Enterprise or business network
- Industrial DMZ
- Operations network
- Control network
- Engineering network
- Cell or area networks
- Safety related environments
- Field or device networks
The important principle is that systems should be grouped according to their function, communication requirements, criticality and security needs.
What Are Conduits?
In the zones and conduits concept associated with ISA/IEC 62443, a conduit represents a controlled communication path between zones.
The purpose is not simply to describe a cable or network link. A conduit represents the communications that are permitted between security zones and the controls applied to those communications.
This is useful because security analysis can then ask two separate questions:
- What systems belong together?
- What communication is allowed between those groups?
That separation makes the architecture easier to analyze and control.
Zones and Conduits in Practical Terms
Consider a simplified plant architecture.
| Zone | Typical Systems | Security Question |
|---|---|---|
| Enterprise | Business applications and corporate systems | What business systems actually need OT access? |
| Industrial DMZ | Selected intermediary services | Which communications should cross between IT and OT? |
| Operations | SCADA, historians and supporting systems | Which control related services are required? |
| Engineering | Engineering workstations and maintenance systems | Which controllers can these systems reach? |
| Control | PLCs and control components | Which systems are allowed to communicate with controllers? |
| Safety | Safety related systems | Does this environment require additional separation? |
This is an example for understanding the concept, not a production architecture that should be copied without engineering analysis.
What Is an Industrial DMZ?
An industrial DMZ is a controlled intermediary network between environments that should not communicate directly.
In a common IT and OT architecture, the industrial DMZ can provide a controlled location for services that need limited interaction with both sides of the boundary.
Examples can include selected data exchange services, jump or bastion systems, remote access infrastructure and other services that have been deliberately designed to operate at the boundary.
CISA guidance recommends using a DMZ between IT and OT environments where appropriate, with firewalls at the relevant boundaries and only essential communications permitted through the intermediary.
Why an Industrial DMZ Is Not Just Another VLAN
A VLAN can provide logical network separation, but a DMZ architecture should be considered as part of a broader security boundary.
The security value comes from how communication is controlled, monitored and restricted at the boundary.
Simply placing systems in a VLAN and allowing unrestricted routing between networks does not create meaningful security segmentation.
How Firewalls Support OT Segmentation
Firewalls can enforce communication policies between network zones.
A well designed firewall policy should reflect the communication requirements of the industrial process rather than simply allow broad connectivity for convenience.
Important questions include:
- Which source systems need access?
- Which destination systems need access?
- Which protocols are required?
- Which ports are required?
- Which direction should communication flow?
- Is the connection permanent or temporary?
- Is the connection monitored?
- Can the rule be removed when it is no longer required?
A firewall rule that allows unrestricted access between an enterprise network and a control network may technically provide connectivity, but it does not represent strong segmentation.
Start With Data Flows, Not Firewall Rules
One of the most important principles in OT segmentation is to understand required communication before designing enforcement rules.
NIST recommends using mapped data flows to identify required communications and then incorporating those requirements into the network architecture and security enforcement mechanisms.
This changes the question from:
“What firewall rules do we currently have?”
to:
“What communication does the process actually require?”
The existing rules can then be compared against that requirement.
Use the Principle of Least Connectivity
OT segmentation should aim to minimize unnecessary communication.
If a workstation needs to communicate with one controller for a defined engineering function, that does not automatically mean it should be able to communicate with every controller in the plant.
Likewise, if a business system needs selected process data, it does not automatically require direct access to control systems.
The objective is to make permitted communication specific enough that unnecessary trust is removed.
Review East West Traffic
Many organizations focus heavily on traffic entering or leaving the OT environment while paying less attention to communication between systems inside the environment.
This internal communication is often called east west traffic.
An assessment should determine whether systems inside the same broad OT environment can communicate unnecessarily with one another.
For example:
- Can every engineering workstation reach every PLC?
- Can every HMI communicate with every controller?
- Can one production cell communicate with another without a defined requirement?
- Can a compromised server reach systems that it does not operationally require?
These questions can reveal segmentation weaknesses that are invisible when the assessment looks only at the IT to OT boundary.
Consider the Purdue Model Carefully
The Purdue Enterprise Reference Architecture is frequently used to explain industrial network levels and segmentation.
It can be useful as a communication and architectural reference, but it should not be treated as a universal blueprint for every modern industrial environment.
NIST SP 800-82 Rev. 3 presents Purdue based architectures alongside other models, including ISA/IEC 62443 concepts and Industrial Internet Consortium approaches.
The practical objective is therefore not to make a plant look like a textbook Purdue diagram. The objective is to create security boundaries that match the organization’s actual processes, assets, communication requirements and risk.
Zones Should Reflect Risk and Function
Two production environments can contain similar equipment but require different segmentation strategies.
The appropriate design depends on factors such as:
- Process criticality
- Safety requirements
- Equipment architecture
- Communication requirements
- Remote access
- Third party connectivity
- Legacy technology
- Availability requirements
- Existing security controls
- Recovery capabilities
NIST specifically recommends considering how the organization of zones and isolation controls affects day to day operations, safety and response capabilities.
Review Remote Access at the Segmentation Boundary
Remote access can undermine otherwise strong segmentation if it creates an uncontrolled path into sensitive systems.
An assessment should determine whether remote users enter through a controlled boundary and whether their access is limited to the systems and functions they actually require.
Important questions include:
- Where does remote access terminate?
- Can remote users reach the control network directly?
- Is a jump or bastion system used where appropriate?
- Are sessions monitored?
- Is access restricted by user, device or function?
- Can temporary vendor access be removed quickly?
Do Not Forget Safety Related Systems
Safety related systems can require additional consideration because their compromise or disruption may have consequences beyond ordinary information security.
The appropriate architecture depends on the safety system, process, engineering requirements and applicable standards.
An assessment should therefore identify safety related assets separately rather than automatically placing them into the same security zone as ordinary control equipment.
Segmentation Should Be Tested Against Reality
A network diagram can show that two zones are supposed to be separated. It does not prove that the separation is actually enforced.
A segmentation assessment should compare intended architecture with observed and configured communication.
| Evidence | Question |
|---|---|
| Network diagram | What separation is intended? |
| Firewall configuration | What traffic is permitted? |
| Routing configuration | Which networks can reach each other? |
| Packet capture | What communication is actually observed? |
| Asset inventory | Which systems are present? |
| Change records | What architecture changes have occurred? |
When these sources disagree, the difference should be investigated.
Common OT Segmentation Mistakes
- Using a flat network for convenience.
- Assuming VLANs alone provide complete security segmentation.
- Allowing broad any to any firewall rules.
- Connecting enterprise systems directly to control networks.
- Ignoring east west communication.
- Allowing remote access to bypass intended boundaries.
- Creating zones without understanding required data flows.
- Copying a reference architecture without considering the actual process.
- Failing to review firewall rules after architecture changes.
- Ignoring undocumented communication paths.
- Placing safety related systems into ordinary control zones without appropriate analysis.
What a Professional OT Segmentation Review Should Deliver
A useful segmentation review should explain how the current architecture works, where important boundaries exist and where communication does not match the intended security design.
- Current network architecture review
- Zone identification
- Conduit and communication path mapping
- Industrial DMZ assessment
- Firewall rule review
- Remote access path review
- East west communication review
- Unexpected connectivity findings
- Segmentation weaknesses
- Operational constraints
- Risk prioritized recommendations
The report should distinguish between architectural observations, policy weaknesses and confirmed technical exposures.
How to Prioritize Segmentation Improvements
Not every segmentation improvement can be implemented immediately. Production dependencies, legacy systems and operational constraints may make architectural changes complex.
Prioritization should consider the importance of the affected systems, the communication being permitted, the potential consequences and the feasibility of reducing the exposure.
| Priority | Example | Typical Action |
|---|---|---|
| High | Unnecessary direct path from enterprise network to sensitive control systems. | Establish a controlled boundary and restrict communication. |
| High | Remote access bypasses intended OT security zones. | Redesign the access path and apply stronger controls. |
| Medium | Broad internal connectivity between systems with limited operational need to communicate. | Review and reduce unnecessary paths. |
| Lower | Documentation does not accurately represent an otherwise controlled architecture. | Update diagrams and change management records. |
Segmentation Is One Layer of Defense
Network segmentation should not be treated as a complete OT cybersecurity strategy.
An industrial environment also needs appropriate asset management, access control, monitoring, vulnerability management, backup and recovery capabilities, secure remote access and incident response processes.
Segmentation is valuable because it can reduce unnecessary communication and help contain the consequences of a compromise. It works best as part of a broader defense in depth strategy.
Final Perspective
Good OT segmentation is not about drawing more boxes on a network diagram.
It is about understanding which systems need to communicate, why they need to communicate, where those communications cross trust boundaries and how those paths are controlled.
Zones provide a way to group systems with similar security requirements. Conduits provide a way to reason about controlled communication between those zones. Industrial DMZs can provide additional boundaries where IT and OT environments require limited data exchange.
The strongest architecture is therefore not necessarily the one with the most zones. It is the one that provides appropriate separation for the actual industrial process while preserving the communication required for safe and reliable operations.
For organizations reviewing their OT security posture, the first practical step is often to map the assets and data flows, compare them with the intended architecture and identify where unnecessary connectivity exists.
Need an Independent OT Segmentation Review?
Cautivra provides focused OT architecture and network segmentation reviews for organizations that need to understand their existing zones, communication paths, industrial DMZ design, firewall boundaries and potential segmentation weaknesses.
The review can combine network documentation, asset information, firewall configuration and authorized traffic evidence to compare the intended architecture with the environment that actually exists.
Request an OT Segmentation Review
Sources and Further Reading
- NIST SP 800-82 Rev. 3, Guide to Operational Technology Security
- CISA, Layering Network Security Through Segmentation
- CISA and USCG, guidance on IT and OT network segmentation
- CISA, Recommended Practices for Defense in Depth for Industrial Control Systems
