A ship can have strong security controls on individual systems and still have a weak security architecture.
The reason is simple: systems do not operate independently.
Navigation equipment communicates with other bridge systems. Engineering workstations communicate with operational equipment. Shore teams may require remote access. Business systems may share infrastructure with operational systems. Satellite connectivity can create another path between the vessel and external networks.
Every connection creates a relationship that should be understood.
IMO’s guidance on cybersecurity onboard ships recommends network separation and traffic management and states that only equipment or systems that need to communicate should generally be able to do so. It also identifies segmentation between OT, IT and public networks as an important part of defence in depth. ([IMO Guidelines on Cyber Security Onboard Ships](https://wwwcdn.imo.org/localresources/en/OurWork/Security/Documents/ANNEX%20Guidelines%20on%20Cyber%20Security%20Onboard%20Ships%20v.4.pdf))
This makes the shipboard network one of the most important areas to examine during a marine OT cybersecurity assessment.
What Is Marine OT Network Security?
Marine OT network security is the practice of protecting the communication infrastructure that connects operational systems onboard a vessel.
It covers more than firewalls.
- Network architecture
- Network segmentation
- Firewalls
- Routers and switches
- Remote access
- Vendor connectivity
- Ship to shore connections
- Engineering workstations
- OT communication paths
- Network monitoring
- External exposure
- Access control
The objective is to make communication paths deliberate, controlled and appropriate for the operational function of the vessel.
Why Shipboard Network Architecture Matters
Imagine two vessels with identical PLCs, HMIs and engineering workstations.
On Vessel A, the systems are separated into controlled network zones with carefully defined communication paths.
On Vessel B, most systems share a broad network and several workstations can communicate with systems that do not require direct connectivity.
The individual devices may be identical.
The security posture is not.
Network architecture determines how far an attacker may be able to move after compromising one system.
A Simplified Ship Network Architecture
SHORE
|
|
Internet / VSAT
|
v
+-------------+
| Firewall |
+-------------+
|
v
DMZ
|
+------------+------------+
| |
v v
Ship IT Network Remote Access
| |
| v
| OT Gateway
| |
+------------+------------+
|
v
OT Network
|
+----------------+----------------+
| | |
v v v
Bridge Engine Power
Systems Control Management
|
v
Navigation
Systems
This is a conceptual architecture. Actual vessel networks vary according to vessel type, equipment, class requirements, age, manufacturer architecture and operational requirements.
IT, OT and Public Networks Should Not Be Treated as One Zone
IMO’s onboard cybersecurity guidance identifies three basic network functions that commonly need to be considered: OT communication and configuration, onboard administrative IT functions, and recreational internet access.
The guidance recommends separating or segmenting OT, IT and public networks using appropriate protection measures. It also notes that further separation between areas such as navigation, engineering and cargo management may be appropriate depending on the risk assessment. ([IMO Guidelines on Cyber Security Onboard Ships](https://wwwcdn.imo.org/localresources/en/OurWork/Security/Documents/ANNEX%20Guidelines%20on%20Cyber%20Security%20Onboard%20Ships%20v.4.pdf))
| Network | Typical Purpose | Security Concern |
|---|---|---|
| Public | Crew and passenger internet access | Large and changing user population |
| IT | Administrative and business systems | Malware, credentials and data compromise |
| OT | Operational monitoring and control | Operational and safety consequences |
| Navigation | Navigation-related systems | Integrity and availability |
| Engineering | Machinery and maintenance systems | Unauthorized control or configuration |
| Cargo | Cargo-related systems | Operational disruption and manipulation |
What Is Network Segmentation?
Network segmentation divides a network into separate security or operational zones and controls communication between those zones.
The objective is not to isolate everything from everything else.
The objective is to allow necessary communication while restricting unnecessary communication.
NETWORK
|
+----------+----------+
| | |
v v v
IT OT Public
| |
| +-------------+
| |
| +---+---+
| | |
| v v
| Engine Power
|
+------ Office Systems
Good segmentation reduces unnecessary trust relationships and can limit the impact of a compromise.
Why Flat Ship Networks Are a Concern
A flat network is not automatically insecure, but broad unrestricted connectivity can increase the consequences of a compromised device.
Consider an engineering workstation that becomes infected.
Compromised Workstation
|
v
Same Network
|
+----+----+----+
| | |
v v v
HMI PLC Server
|
v
OT System
If the workstation has unrestricted access to systems that it does not need to communicate with, the compromise may have a larger potential impact.
Segmentation can reduce these unnecessary paths.
What Should a Marine OT Network Assessment Map?
- Network zones
- IP address ranges
- VLANs
- Routers
- Switches
- Firewalls
- Gateways
- Engineering workstations
- HMIs
- PLCs and controllers
- Navigation systems
- Power systems
- Remote access infrastructure
- Satellite links
- Shore connections
- Wireless networks
- Vendor connections
Firewall Security on a Vessel
A firewall can be an important security boundary between network zones, but the presence of a firewall does not prove that the boundary is correctly configured.
A firewall review should examine the actual communication requirements.
| Question | Why It Matters |
|---|---|
| Which networks can communicate? | Identifies trust relationships. |
| Which ports are allowed? | Identifies exposed services. |
| Which source addresses are permitted? | Defines access boundaries. |
| Which destination systems are reachable? | Shows potential attack paths. |
| Are unused rules present? | Reduces unnecessary exposure. |
| Are temporary vendor rules still active? | Identifies persistent access. |
| Are rules logged? | Supports monitoring and investigation. |
A good firewall review therefore starts with operational requirements and then evaluates whether the actual configuration matches those requirements.
Remote Access Is One of the Most Important Boundaries
Remote access allows engineers, equipment manufacturers and service providers to support vessels without being physically onboard.
That can reduce maintenance time and improve operational support.
It can also create a path from an external environment toward onboard systems.
Vendor
|
v
Internet
|
v
Remote Access Gateway
|
v
Ship Firewall
|
v
DMZ
|
v
OT Boundary
|
v
Engineering Workstation
|
v
OT Equipment
Every step in this path should have an explicit security purpose.
Remote Access Assessment Checklist
- Who is authorized to connect?
- What system do they connect to?
- What network can they reach?
- Is access enabled continuously?
- Is access restricted to approved periods?
- Is strong authentication used?
- Are sessions logged?
- Can individual accounts be identified?
- Can vendor access be disabled?
- Is direct access to critical OT permitted?
- Is a jump host or gateway used?
- Are remote activities reviewed?
Vendor Remote Access Deserves Special Attention
Marine OT environments frequently depend on equipment suppliers and specialist service providers.
This can create legitimate third-party access requirements.
The security problem begins when access becomes permanent, excessive or difficult to monitor.
A stronger design follows a principle such as:
Access only what is required, only when required, with accountability for who used it.
Ship-to-Shore Connectivity
Modern vessels may exchange data with shore-based infrastructure through satellite or other communication links.
These connections can support business applications, monitoring, maintenance, operational services and remote assistance.
From a cybersecurity perspective, the assessment should identify what crosses the boundary.
SHORE
|
Shore Infrastructure
|
v
Internet / VSAT
|
v
Communication Gateway
|
v
Firewall
|
v
DMZ
|
+-------+-------+
| |
v v
IT OT
| |
| +------+------+
| | |
v v v
Office Engine Bridge
Systems Systems Systems
The security objective is to ensure that external connectivity does not create unnecessary access to operational systems.
What Is a DMZ in a Marine OT Network?
A demilitarized zone, or DMZ, is a controlled network zone placed between networks with different trust requirements.
In a shipboard environment, a DMZ may be used to provide controlled services between external or IT networks and protected OT environments.
External Network
|
v
Firewall
|
v
DMZ
|
v
Firewall
|
v
OT Zone
A DMZ should not become a convenient bridge into OT.
Its security value depends on the controls surrounding it and the communication requirements implemented through it.
Network Segmentation as Defence in Depth
IMO’s onboard cybersecurity guidance identifies network segmentation as a key aspect of defence in depth and recommends appropriate separation of OT, IT and public networks. It also notes that further segmentation between navigation, engineering and cargo management systems may be considered. ([IMO Guidelines on Cyber Security Onboard Ships](https://wwwcdn.imo.org/localresources/en/OurWork/Security/Documents/ANNEX%20Guidelines%20on%20Cyber%20Security%20Onboard%20Ships%20v.4.pdf))
A layered architecture can therefore look like:
Internet
|
Perimeter
Firewall
|
DMZ
|
Internal Firewall
|
+--------+--------+
| | |
v v v
IT OT Core Admin
|
+--------+--------+
| | |
v v v
Bridge Engineering Cargo
The actual number of zones should be driven by operational requirements and risk rather than by a fixed template.
Communication Should Have a Reason
One of the strongest principles in ship network security is simple:
If two systems do not need to communicate, there should be a reason before communication is allowed.
IMO’s guidance expresses a similar principle by recommending that only equipment or systems that need to communicate should generally be able to do so, with network connectivity determined by operational need. ([IMO Guidelines on Cyber Security Onboard Ships](https://wwwcdn.imo.org/localresources/en/OurWork/Security/Documents/ANNEX%20Guidelines%20on%20Cyber%20Security%20Onboard%20Ships%20v.4.pdf))
Network Security Assessment Methodology
A marine OT network assessment should progress from architecture understanding toward controlled technical validation.
Phase 1: Define the Scope
- Identify the vessel.
- Define networks in scope.
- Identify operational restrictions.
- Identify authorized testing methods.
- Define assessment objectives.
Phase 2: Collect Network Documentation
- Network diagrams
- IP addressing information
- VLAN information
- Firewall configurations
- Router configurations
- Switch configurations
- Remote access architecture
- Vendor connectivity documentation
Phase 3: Identify Assets
Build or validate an inventory of network-connected devices and identify their operational functions.
Phase 4: Map Communication Paths
Identify which systems communicate, why they communicate and through which network boundaries.
Phase 5: Review Segmentation
- IT and OT separation
- Public network separation
- Navigation segmentation
- Engineering segmentation
- Cargo system segmentation
- Management network separation
Phase 6: Review Firewall Rules
Compare firewall rules against documented operational requirements and identify unnecessary, overly broad or obsolete access.
Phase 7: Review Remote Access
Assess external access paths, authentication, authorization, logging and vendor access controls.
Phase 8: Analyze Network Traffic
Where authorized traffic captures are available, analyze communication patterns to validate the documented architecture.
Phase 9: Controlled Technical Validation
Where appropriate, perform carefully scoped technical validation in accordance with the vessel’s operational constraints and authorization.
Phase 10: Risk and Remediation
Prioritize findings based on exposure, connectivity, exploitability, operational consequence and existing controls.
Where Wireshark Fits
Wireshark can be valuable when a network capture is available for analysis.
It can help determine whether actual traffic matches the expected network architecture.
- Identify communicating hosts.
- Identify protocols.
- Observe connection patterns.
- Identify unexpected communication.
- Investigate suspicious traffic.
- Validate segmentation assumptions.
- Support incident investigation.
For OT environments, passive analysis can be particularly valuable because it can provide visibility without requiring intrusive interaction with operational equipment.
Where Nmap Fits
Nmap can support authorized network discovery and service identification.
However, a marine OT assessment should never assume that active scanning is harmless simply because it is common in IT security.
Operational equipment can contain legacy systems, proprietary implementations and devices with different tolerance for unexpected traffic.
| Assessment Environment | Approach |
|---|---|
| External infrastructure | Authorized exposure discovery. |
| Corporate IT | Controlled active assessment where authorized. |
| Marine OT laboratory | Controlled technical testing. |
| Live critical OT | Passive or specifically authorized testing based on risk. |
Where Shodan Fits
Shodan can support external attack surface intelligence.
- Publicly visible services
- Open ports
- Service banners
- Certificates
- Internet-facing devices
- Related infrastructure
However, Shodan data should be interpreted carefully.
An internet-visible service does not automatically prove that a vessel’s internal OT network is reachable.
External exposure assessment should therefore be treated as one layer of the broader security review.
External Exposure Assessment
A marine OT security review should establish what the vessel exposes beyond its physical boundaries.
| Exposure | Assessment Question |
|---|---|
| Internet | Are any services publicly reachable? |
| Satellite | What communication paths exist? |
| Remote access | Who can connect from shore? |
| Vendor access | Which suppliers have connectivity? |
| Wireless | Which wireless networks exist? |
| Maintenance | Can external devices connect during maintenance? |
| Removable media | Can external data enter OT systems? |
Remote Access and Zero Trust Principles
Traditional network designs often assume that being inside a trusted network is sufficient.
Modern security architecture increasingly emphasizes explicit authentication, authorization and least-privilege access.
For marine OT, the principle can be translated into practical questions:
- Who is the user?
- What device are they using?
- Why do they need access?
- Which system do they need?
- How long should access remain available?
- What actions should they be allowed to perform?
- How is the activity recorded?
The exact architecture should be appropriate for the vessel’s operational requirements and safety constraints.
Network Monitoring in Marine OT
Prevention is only one part of network security.
A vessel should also consider how unusual activity would be detected.
- Unexpected network connections
- New devices
- Unusual traffic volumes
- Unexpected protocols
- Repeated authentication failures
- Unexpected remote sessions
- Communication across restricted zones
Network monitoring can provide evidence for incident investigation and support the detection function within a broader maritime cyber risk management program.
Network Architecture and IACS Cyber Resilience
IACS UR E26 addresses cyber resilience at the ship level and aims to ensure secure integration of IT and OT equipment into the vessel network across the ship’s design, construction, commissioning and operational life. IACS identifies equipment identification, protection, attack detection, response and recovery as key aspects of the requirement. ([IACS: Cyber Safety Requirements](https://iacs.org.uk/news/iacs-adopts-new-requirements-on-cyber-safety/))
This is important because network security is not an isolated technical activity.
It contributes to the vessel’s broader cyber resilience.
IACS Network Architecture Recommendations
IACS has also published cyber resilience guidance covering network architecture, network security, remote access, inventory, integration and communication interfaces. Its consolidated Recommendation No. 166 applies to computer-based systems providing functions such as control, alarm, monitoring, safety and internal communication and covers vessel network systems that interconnect systems within the ship as well as systems accessible from outside the ship. ([IACS Recommendation on Cyber Resilience](https://iacs.org.uk/news/iacs-launches-single-standalone-recommendation-on-cyber-resilience/))
A Practical Marine OT Network Security Checklist
| Area | Question | Status |
|---|---|---|
| Architecture | Is the complete network architecture documented? | ☐ |
| Asset inventory | Are network-connected OT assets identified? | ☐ |
| Segmentation | Are IT, OT and public networks separated? | ☐ |
| Navigation | Are navigation systems appropriately protected? | ☐ |
| Engineering | Are engineering systems appropriately isolated? | ☐ |
| Firewalls | Are firewall rules aligned with operational requirements? | ☐ |
| DMZ | Are intermediary zones appropriately controlled? | ☐ |
| Remote access | Is external access controlled and monitored? | ☐ |
| Vendor access | Is third-party access limited to required systems? | ☐ |
| Monitoring | Can abnormal communication be detected? | ☐ |
| Logging | Are security-relevant events recorded? | ☐ |
| Recovery | Can network configurations be restored? | ☐ |
Common Marine OT Network Security Mistakes
- Assuming a firewall automatically makes the network secure.
- Using a flat network for unrelated systems.
- Allowing unnecessary IT to OT communication.
- Leaving vendor remote access permanently enabled.
- Using broad firewall rules without documented operational justification.
- Failing to review obsolete firewall rules.
- Ignoring ship to shore communication paths.
- Ignoring wireless and maintenance interfaces.
- Running aggressive scans against critical OT without appropriate authorization.
- Relying exclusively on external exposure tools.
- Failing to monitor network boundaries.
- Not maintaining an accurate network diagram.
What a Marine OT Network Security Report Should Contain
| Section | Purpose |
|---|---|
| Executive summary | Explain the overall network security posture. |
| Scope | Define the vessel and systems reviewed. |
| Network architecture | Document the relevant zones and communication paths. |
| Asset inventory | Identify network-connected systems. |
| Segmentation review | Evaluate network boundaries. |
| Firewall review | Evaluate access rules. |
| Remote access review | Assess external connectivity. |
| Traffic analysis | Validate actual communication where evidence is available. |
| Exposure assessment | Identify external attack surface. |
| Findings | Document security weaknesses. |
| Risk ranking | Prioritize issues based on operational relevance. |
| Recommendations | Provide practical remediation actions. |
| Limitations | Clearly identify what was not tested. |
Remote Marine OT Network Security Review
A meaningful portion of a marine OT network assessment can be performed remotely when appropriate evidence is available.
- Network diagrams
- Firewall configurations
- Router and switch configurations
- Asset inventories
- Remote access documentation
- Vendor access records
- Network traffic captures
- Vulnerability information
- External exposure data
- Security logs
Remote review can identify architectural and configuration weaknesses without automatically introducing intrusive activity into a live vessel OT environment.
Safe Assessment Before Active Testing
One of the strongest principles in OT security is to understand the environment before interacting with it.
Documentation
↓
Asset Inventory
↓
Network Architecture
↓
Passive Analysis
↓
Configuration Review
↓
Risk Assessment
↓
Controlled Validation
↓
Active Testing When Appropriate
↓
Final Report
This approach is particularly relevant to vessels because network-connected systems can support functions with operational or safety implications.
How Network Security Supports Maritime Cyber Resilience
IMO’s maritime cyber risk framework describes cyber risk management as a process of identifying, analysing, assessing and communicating cyber-related risk and then treating that risk to an acceptable level. The overall goal is safe and secure shipping that remains operationally resilient to cyber risks. ([IMO Maritime Cyber Risk](https://www.imo.org/en/ourwork/security/pages/cyber-security.aspx))
Network security contributes to several parts of that lifecycle.
| Cyber Resilience Function | Network Contribution |
|---|---|
| Identify | Asset and communication mapping. |
| Protect | Segmentation and access control. |
| Detect | Traffic monitoring and security logging. |
| Respond | Network isolation and access control during incidents. |
| Recover | Restoration of network configurations and connectivity. |
The Most Important Question in Marine OT Network Security
Do not begin with:
“Which firewall should the ship use?”
Begin with:
“Which systems need to communicate, why do they need to communicate, and what should happen if that communication becomes compromised?”
That question leads to architecture rather than products.
Final Perspective
Marine OT network security is fundamentally about controlling relationships between systems.
A ship may contain dozens or hundreds of digital assets, but the real security picture emerges from the connections between them.
Map the assets.
Map the communication paths.
Separate networks according to operational need.
Control remote access.
Review firewall rules against actual requirements.
Monitor important boundaries.
And before performing active testing, understand what the equipment is designed to do and what could happen if the assessment itself affects operations.
A secure ship network is not the network with the most controls. It is the network where every important communication path has a reason, a boundary and an owner.
Need a Marine OT Network Security Review?
Cautivra provides remote, evidence-based marine OT network security reviews for vessel operators, engineering teams and technology providers.
Depending on project scope, the review can examine network architecture, segmentation, firewall configurations, remote access, vendor connectivity, external exposure, network captures and existing security controls.
The objective is to identify unnecessary exposure and architectural weaknesses and translate them into practical remediation priorities.
Request a Marine OT Network Security Review
Frequently Asked Questions
What is marine OT network security?
Marine OT network security protects the communication infrastructure connecting operational systems onboard a vessel. It includes network architecture, segmentation, firewalls, remote access, vendor connectivity, monitoring and other controls that protect operational communication.
Why is network segmentation important on ships?
Segmentation can reduce unnecessary communication between systems and limit the potential impact of a compromised device. IMO guidance identifies separation of OT, IT and public networks as an important aspect of defence in depth.
Should ship IT and OT networks be separated?
They should be appropriately separated or segmented according to the vessel’s operational requirements and risk assessment. The exact architecture depends on the vessel and its systems.
Why is remote access a marine cybersecurity concern?
Remote access creates a connection between external users or systems and onboard infrastructure. If poorly controlled, it can create unnecessary paths toward operational systems. Access should therefore be limited, authenticated, authorized and monitored according to operational requirements.
Can Shodan identify vulnerable ship OT systems?
Shodan can provide useful external attack surface intelligence, but it cannot by itself establish that an internal ship OT system is vulnerable or reachable. Its findings must be validated against the actual vessel architecture and authorized evidence.
Can Nmap be used to assess marine OT networks?
Nmap can support authorized network discovery and service identification, but active scanning of live OT equipment requires careful consideration. Passive analysis and configuration review may be more appropriate as an initial assessment method.
Can Wireshark help with ship OT security?
Yes. When suitable and authorized network captures are available, Wireshark can help analyze communication patterns, protocols, communicating hosts and unexpected traffic.
What should a marine OT network assessment include?
A practical assessment can include network architecture, asset inventory, segmentation, firewall rules, remote access, vendor connectivity, external exposure, traffic analysis, monitoring and recovery capabilities.
Can marine OT network security be assessed remotely?
Yes. Architecture diagrams, firewall configurations, network captures, asset inventories, remote access documentation and external exposure information can support a remote review. Active testing of live operational systems requires separate authorization and appropriate safety controls.