A modern ship is no longer an isolated mechanical system.
Navigation, propulsion, power generation, cargo operations, communications and monitoring increasingly depend on interconnected digital systems.
That connectivity creates significant operational benefits. It can improve situational awareness, maintenance, efficiency, remote support and coordination between ship and shore.
It also changes the cybersecurity problem.
A cyber incident affecting a ship can become an operational or safety problem when information systems and operational technology are connected to systems that monitor or control physical processes.
The International Maritime Organization recognizes this relationship and defines maritime cyber risk in terms of potential operational, safety or security failures resulting from technology assets being compromised, corrupted or lost. IMO’s guidance also emphasizes that increasing connectivity between shipboard IT and OT systems can increase cyber vulnerabilities and risks. [oai_citation:0‡International Maritime Organization](https://www.imo.org/en/ourwork/security/pages/cyber-security.aspx?utm_source=chatgpt.com)
This article explains the ship OT attack surface, the systems that should be considered during an assessment, how IT and OT connectivity changes risk, and how a practical vessel cybersecurity assessment can be structured.
What Is Ship OT?
Operational Technology, or OT, refers to hardware and software used to monitor or control physical devices, processes and events.
On a vessel, OT can include systems involved in propulsion, power management, steering, machinery monitoring, cargo operations and other physical processes.
Information Technology, or IT, primarily manages information, computing resources and data.
| Technology | Typical Role |
|---|---|
| IT | Data, business applications, office systems and information processing. |
| OT | Monitoring and control of physical processes and equipment. |
| IT/OT interface | Exchange of information between business systems and operational systems. |
The distinction matters because the consequences of a compromise can be very different.
A compromised office workstation may affect business information.
A compromised system connected to propulsion, steering, power or other operational functions may have consequences beyond data confidentiality.
Why Ship OT Cybersecurity Matters
Shipping has become increasingly dependent on digital systems and connectivity.
IMO’s Guidelines on Cyber Security Onboard Ships explain that increasing connectivity between servers, IT systems and OT systems creates additional cyber vulnerabilities and risks. The guidance recommends a cyber risk management approach covering work processes, equipment, training, incident response and recovery. [oai_citation:1‡International Maritime Organization](https://wwwcdn.imo.org/localresources/en/OurWork/Security/Documents/ANNEX%20Guidelines%20on%20Cyber%20Security%20Onboard%20Ships%20v.4.pdf?utm_source=chatgpt.com)
IMO’s current maritime cyber risk framework defines cyber risk management as the process of identifying, analysing, assessing and communicating cyber-related risk and then deciding how that risk should be treated. [oai_citation:2‡International Maritime Organization](https://www.imo.org/en/ourwork/security/pages/cyber-security.aspx?utm_source=chatgpt.com)
For ship operators, this means cybersecurity cannot be treated solely as an IT department responsibility.
It needs to consider the vessel’s operational technology, people, processes, connectivity and physical consequences.
The Ship OT Attack Surface
A ship’s attack surface is larger than its internet connection.
A practical assessment should consider both direct and indirect paths toward onboard systems.
SHIP
|
+------------+------------+
| |
IT OT
| |
+-------+-------+ +---------+---------+
| | | | | |
v v v v v v
Office Email Admin Bridge Engine Power
Systems Systems Systems Systems Control Management
| | | |
+-----------+-----------+---------+---------+
|
v
Shipboard Network
|
+-------+-------+
| |
v v
Remote Access Shore Systems
|
v
Internet / VSAT
This is a conceptual model rather than a universal ship architecture. Actual vessel networks differ by vessel type, age, equipment suppliers, class requirements and operational design.
What Systems Should Be Considered?
A ship OT assessment should begin with an asset inventory rather than assumptions.
- Integrated Bridge Systems
- Electronic Chart Display and Information Systems
- Radar systems
- Automatic Identification System
- Global Navigation Satellite System equipment
- Voyage Data Recorders
- Autopilot systems
- Steering control systems
- Propulsion control systems
- Engine monitoring systems
- Power Management Systems
- Generators and associated controllers
- Programmable Logic Controllers
- Human Machine Interfaces
- Cargo control systems
- Ballast control systems
- Alarm and monitoring systems
- Engineering workstations
- Remote maintenance systems
The exact inventory should be determined for the vessel under assessment.
Bridge Systems Are Part of the Cybersecurity Picture
Navigation systems are increasingly digital and interconnected.
Depending on the vessel architecture, bridge systems may exchange information with navigation sensors, positioning systems, communications equipment, voyage planning systems and other onboard systems.
That connectivity can improve operational capability while also creating additional dependencies that should be understood during a cybersecurity assessment.
A security review should therefore ask:
- Which systems exchange data with the bridge?
- Which interfaces are externally connected?
- Which systems can modify navigation-related data?
- How are engineering and maintenance interfaces controlled?
- What happens if a connected system becomes unavailable?
- How are abnormal events detected?
Propulsion and Engine Control
Propulsion systems represent a fundamentally different security concern from ordinary business IT.
Depending on the vessel, propulsion-related control may involve controllers, monitoring systems, engineering workstations, alarms, sensors, actuators and communication networks.
A cybersecurity assessment should focus on architecture and risk rather than attempting uncontrolled interaction with operational equipment.
Important questions include:
- Which systems can communicate with propulsion-related equipment?
- Are engineering workstations connected to other networks?
- Are remote maintenance paths available?
- Are unnecessary services disabled?
- How are configuration changes controlled?
- How can the system recover after a cyber incident?
Power Management Systems
Shipboard electrical systems increasingly depend on digital monitoring and control.
Power Management Systems can interact with generators, switchboards, load management functions and other electrical equipment.
The security concern is not simply whether a workstation is vulnerable.
The more important question is what physical process could ultimately be affected if that workstation, controller or communication path were compromised.
Why IT and OT Segmentation Matters
One of the most important questions in a ship OT assessment is:
Can a compromise of an IT system create a path toward an OT system?
Segmentation can reduce unnecessary communication between different security domains.
Internet
|
v
Satellite / Shore Link
|
v
IT Network
|
v
Firewall
|
v
DMZ
|
v
OT Boundary
|
+--------+--------+--------+
| | | |
v v v v
Bridge Engine Power Cargo
Systems Control Systems Systems
This is an example architecture, not a mandatory design for every vessel.
The purpose of segmentation is to make communication paths deliberate, controlled and easier to monitor.
Flat Networks Increase Security Risk
A flat network can allow systems that do not need to communicate with one another to share the same network environment.
If one system is compromised, unnecessary connectivity can make subsequent movement easier.
A ship OT assessment should therefore document:
- Network segments
- IP ranges
- VLANs
- Firewalls
- Routers
- Switches
- Remote access gateways
- Engineering workstations
- OT controllers
- External connections
Remote Access Is a Critical Assessment Area
Remote access can be operationally valuable.
Equipment manufacturers, maintenance providers and shore-based engineering teams may require remote access for diagnostics, maintenance or support.
But every remote access mechanism creates another security boundary that needs to be understood.
IMO’s onboard cybersecurity guidance specifically highlights the importance of identifying external connections and considering how connectivity between shipboard systems and external systems affects cyber risk. [oai_citation:3‡International Maritime Organization](https://wwwcdn.imo.org/localresources/en/OurWork/Security/Documents/ANNEX%20Guidelines%20on%20Cyber%20Security%20Onboard%20Ships%20v.4.pdf?utm_source=chatgpt.com)
Questions for a Ship Remote Access Review
- Who can access the vessel remotely?
- Which systems can they reach?
- Is access always enabled?
- Is multi-factor authentication used where appropriate?
- Is access logged?
- Can vendor access be disabled when not required?
- Are remote sessions monitored?
- Is there a controlled jump host or gateway?
- Can remote users reach safety-critical OT directly?
- What happens if the remote access system is compromised?
Satellite and Ship-to-Shore Connectivity
Modern vessels may depend on satellite communications and other ship-to-shore connections for operational and business functions.
Connectivity itself is not a vulnerability.
The security question is what systems become reachable through that connectivity and what controls exist between the external connection and onboard assets.
A practical review should therefore map the complete path:
External Network
|
v
Satellite / Communication Link
|
v
Ship Router
|
v
Firewall
|
v
DMZ
|
v
IT Network
|
v
OT Boundary
|
v
Operational Systems
Every transition represents a security boundary that should be understood and documented.
External Exposure Is Not the Same as Internal Vulnerability
This distinction is critical when performing maritime cybersecurity research.
Public internet intelligence platforms can identify exposed infrastructure, domains, certificates, services and other indicators.
However, finding an exposed service does not automatically prove that a ship’s internal OT network is vulnerable.
Likewise, finding a software version associated with a known vulnerability does not prove that the vulnerable condition is exploitable in the specific vessel architecture.
Professional assessment requires validation, context and evidence.
Where Shodan Can Help
Shodan can be useful for authorized external exposure research.
- Identify publicly visible services.
- Review internet-facing infrastructure.
- Identify exposed ports and protocols.
- Review service banners.
- Identify certificates and related infrastructure.
- Support external attack-surface mapping.
It should not be presented as a tool that can see inside a vessel’s isolated OT network.
External exposure intelligence is one part of maritime OT assessment, not a substitute for an onboard architecture review.
Where Nmap Can Help
Nmap can support network discovery and service identification in an authorized assessment environment.
However, active scanning requires additional caution in OT environments.
Safety-critical systems may contain legacy devices, proprietary implementations or equipment that has not been designed to tolerate aggressive network probing.
A professional assessment should therefore select the scanning method according to the target environment.
| Environment | Preferred Approach |
|---|---|
| Public infrastructure | Passive external intelligence and authorized exposure review. |
| Corporate IT | Controlled active assessment where authorized. |
| Ship OT laboratory | Controlled active testing. |
| Live safety-critical OT | Passive or specifically authorized testing based on risk. |
Wireshark and Ship OT Traffic Analysis
Network traffic analysis can provide valuable evidence about how systems communicate.
Wireshark can help analyze supported network captures and protocols when suitable capture data is available.
For OT environments, traffic analysis can help answer questions such as:
- Which systems communicate?
- Which protocols are in use?
- Which hosts communicate frequently?
- Which connections are unexpected?
- Are there unusual communication patterns?
- Which systems communicate across security boundaries?
Traffic analysis becomes significantly more useful when a normal operational baseline is available.
Build a Ship OT Asset Inventory First
You cannot protect assets that you do not know exist.
An asset inventory should identify systems, their functions, communication relationships and security relevance.
| Asset | Function | Network | Criticality |
|---|---|---|---|
| HMI | Operator interface | OT | High |
| PLC | Process control | OT | High |
| Engineering workstation | Configuration and maintenance | OT | High |
| Navigation workstation | Navigation operation | Bridge | High |
| Server | Data/application service | IT/OT | Medium/High |
| Router | Network connectivity | IT | High |
The criticality rating should be based on the vessel’s specific operational context.
Map the Ship’s Communication Paths
An asset inventory tells you what exists.
A communication map tells you how those assets interact.
Shore
|
Remote Access
|
v
Firewall
|
v
DMZ
|
+-------+-------+
| |
v v
Ship IT Ship OT
| |
| +-------+-------+
| | | |
v v v v
Office Bridge Engine Power
Systems Control Systems
The purpose is not to create a visually impressive diagram.
The purpose is to identify unnecessary trust relationships and communication paths.
Ship OT Cybersecurity Assessment Methodology
A professional assessment should progress from low-risk information gathering toward controlled technical validation.
Phase 1: Define Scope
- Identify the vessel.
- Define systems in scope.
- Identify assessment objectives.
- Define authorized activities.
- Identify safety restrictions.
- Define data-handling requirements.
Phase 2: Collect Documentation
- Network diagrams
- Asset inventories
- Equipment lists
- System architecture documents
- Firewall documentation
- Remote access documentation
- Vendor documentation
- Maintenance procedures
- Incident response procedures
Phase 3: Asset Identification
Identify the hardware, software, network interfaces and operational functions that make up the vessel’s digital environment.
Phase 4: Network Mapping
Document the communication paths between IT, OT, bridge systems, engineering systems, shore connections and remote access infrastructure.
Phase 5: Exposure Assessment
- Internet exposure
- Remote access
- Vendor connectivity
- Unnecessary services
- External interfaces
- Wireless connectivity
- Removable media paths
Phase 6: Vulnerability Assessment
Review identified software, firmware, services, configurations and known vulnerabilities according to the authorized assessment methodology.
Vulnerability intelligence should be correlated with the actual asset, version, configuration and operational context.
Phase 7: Risk Analysis
Prioritize findings based on likelihood, exposure, exploitability, operational consequence and the criticality of the affected system.
Phase 8: Remediation
Translate technical findings into practical engineering actions that can be implemented without creating unacceptable operational or safety risk.
Phase 9: Reporting
Produce an evidence-based report containing findings, affected assets, risk ratings, evidence, limitations and recommended actions.
Ship OT Assessment Framework
Ship Cybersecurity
|
+------------+------------+
| | |
v v v
ASSET NETWORK EXPOSURE
REVIEW REVIEW REVIEW
| | |
+------------+------------+
|
v
VULNERABILITY
REVIEW
|
v
RISK ANALYSIS
|
v
REMEDIATION
|
v
REPORT
What Should a Ship OT Assessment Examine?
| Area | Assessment Question |
|---|---|
| Assets | Are critical OT assets identified? |
| Architecture | Is the vessel’s network architecture documented? |
| Segmentation | Are IT and OT appropriately separated? |
| Remote access | Who can access onboard systems remotely? |
| External exposure | Which services or systems are externally reachable? |
| Firewalls | Are unnecessary communication paths blocked? |
| Workstations | Are engineering systems adequately protected? |
| Vulnerabilities | Are known vulnerabilities identified and evaluated? |
| Monitoring | Can abnormal activity be detected? |
| Backup | Can critical configurations and systems be restored? |
| Response | Is there an OT-aware incident response process? |
| Recovery | Can the vessel recover safely from a cyber incident? |
Vulnerability Scanning in Ship OT
Vulnerability scanning is useful, but the method matters.
Traditional IT vulnerability scanning assumes that systems can tolerate certain levels of active probing.
That assumption cannot automatically be transferred to operational technology.
For ship OT, an assessment may begin with:
- Documentation review
- Passive asset discovery
- Network traffic analysis
- Configuration review
- Version identification
- Vulnerability intelligence correlation
- Controlled validation in suitable environments
Active scanning should be performed only when it is authorized, technically justified and appropriately controlled for the target environment.
Why Passive Assessment Is Valuable
Passive assessment can reveal valuable information without directly interacting with sensitive operational equipment.
Depending on available data, passive analysis can help identify:
- Communicating hosts
- Network segments
- Protocols
- Traffic patterns
- Unexpected connections
- Potential legacy devices
- Communication between IT and OT
- Unusual traffic behavior
For safety-critical OT, this can be an important first step before any active technical validation.
Ship OT Cybersecurity Is Not Just Vulnerability Scanning
A vulnerability scanner can identify software weaknesses.
It cannot by itself tell you whether the vessel’s architecture provides adequate segmentation, whether a remote access path is appropriately controlled, or what operational consequence a compromise could create.
A stronger assessment combines:
- Asset intelligence
- Architecture analysis
- Network analysis
- Exposure assessment
- Vulnerability intelligence
- Configuration review
- Threat analysis
- Operational impact assessment
- Risk prioritization
IMO Maritime Cyber Risk Management
IMO’s maritime cyber risk framework provides a useful foundation for structuring a vessel cybersecurity program.
The current IMO guidance identifies core functional elements including identifying, protecting, detecting, responding and recovering from cyber risks and incidents. [oai_citation:4‡International Maritime Organization](https://www.imo.org/en/ourwork/security/pages/cyber-security.aspx?utm_source=chatgpt.com)
IDENTIFY
↓
PROTECT
↓
DETECT
↓
RESPOND
↓
RECOVER
↓
CONTINUOUS IMPROVEMENT
This lifecycle is more useful than treating cybersecurity as a one-time penetration test.
IMO and the Ship Safety Management System
IMO’s Maritime Safety Committee adopted Resolution MSC.428(98) in 2017, establishing that an approved Safety Management System should consider cyber risk management in accordance with the objectives and functional requirements of the ISM Code. [oai_citation:5‡International Maritime Organization](https://www.imo.org/en/ourwork/security/pages/cyber-security.aspx?utm_source=chatgpt.com)
This is an important shift in perspective.
Cybersecurity is not only a technology issue. It is also part of operational risk management.
IACS UR E26 and Ship Cyber Resilience
The International Association of Classification Societies has developed requirements specifically addressing cyber resilience in ships.
IACS UR E26 addresses cyber resilience of ships and focuses on the secure integration of IT and OT into vessel networks. IACS describes the framework around equipment identification, protection, attack detection, response and recovery. [oai_citation:6‡IACS](https://iacs.org.uk/news/iacs-adopts-new-requirements-on-cyber-safety/?utm_source=chatgpt.com)
This makes E26 highly relevant when evaluating ship-level cyber resilience.
IACS UR E27 and Onboard Equipment
IACS UR E27 focuses on cyber resilience of onboard systems and equipment.
The requirement addresses the security and integrity of onboard systems and equipment and includes considerations related to system interfaces and product development. [oai_citation:7‡IACS](https://iacs.org.uk/resolutions/unified-requirements/ur-e/ur-e27-rev1?utm_source=chatgpt.com)
This creates an important distinction:
| Focus | Question |
|---|---|
| Ship-level security | Is the vessel’s overall architecture resilient? |
| Equipment-level security | Are onboard systems and equipment appropriately secured? |
| Operational security | Can threats be detected and managed during operation? |
Ship OT Cybersecurity and Risk
Not every vulnerability deserves the same priority.
A vulnerability in an isolated administrative workstation may have a very different operational impact from a weakness affecting a system connected to propulsion or navigation functions.
A practical risk model should therefore consider more than CVSS alone.
| Factor | Question |
|---|---|
| Exposure | Can an attacker reach the asset? |
| Exploitability | How difficult is exploitation? |
| Connectivity | What other systems can be reached? |
| Criticality | How important is the affected function? |
| Operational impact | What could happen if the system fails? |
| Safety impact | Could people, environment or vessel safety be affected? |
| Existing controls | What compensating protections exist? |
Example Ship OT Risk Prioritization
| Finding | Technical Risk | Operational Context | Priority |
|---|---|---|---|
| Exposed administrative service | Medium | Limited connectivity | Medium |
| Uncontrolled vendor remote access | High | OT reachable | High |
| Legacy engineering workstation | High | Connected to OT | High |
| Weakly segmented network | High | Multiple critical systems | Critical |
These ratings are illustrative. A real assessment must use evidence from the vessel under review.
Ship OT Cybersecurity Assessment Checklist
| Area | Question | Status |
|---|---|---|
| Asset inventory | Are critical OT assets identified? | ☐ |
| Network architecture | Is the vessel network documented? | ☐ |
| IT/OT separation | Are security boundaries defined? | ☐ |
| Remote access | Are vendor and shore connections controlled? | ☐ |
| External exposure | Are internet-facing services known? | ☐ |
| Firewall | Are unnecessary communication paths blocked? | ☐ |
| Engineering workstations | Are critical workstations protected? | ☐ |
| Vulnerabilities | Are known weaknesses identified? | ☐ |
| Monitoring | Can abnormal OT traffic be detected? | ☐ |
| Backup | Are critical configurations backed up? | ☐ |
| Incident response | Is there an OT-aware response procedure? | ☐ |
| Recovery | Can critical systems be restored safely? | ☐ |
What a Professional Ship OT Security Report Should Contain
| Section | Purpose |
|---|---|
| Executive summary | Explain the overall security posture. |
| Scope | Define systems and activities reviewed. |
| Asset inventory | Document relevant systems. |
| Network architecture | Show communication paths. |
| External exposure | Document reachable infrastructure. |
| Security controls | Evaluate existing protections. |
| Vulnerabilities | Document technical weaknesses. |
| Risk assessment | Prioritize findings. |
| Evidence | Support conclusions with technical data. |
| Recommendations | Provide practical remediation actions. |
| Limitations | Clearly identify what was not tested. |
Remote Ship OT Cybersecurity Assessment
Not every component of a ship cybersecurity assessment requires physical access to a vessel.
Depending on the engagement, a remote assessment can use customer-provided documentation, architecture diagrams, configuration information, network captures, vulnerability data and security logs.
- Asset inventory review
- Network architecture review
- Firewall configuration review
- Remote access assessment
- External exposure assessment
- Vulnerability intelligence review
- Network traffic analysis
- Risk assessment
- Cybersecurity gap analysis
- Remediation planning
This approach can provide useful independent analysis without immediately performing intrusive testing against live safety-critical systems.
When Active Testing Is Appropriate
Active testing has a place in maritime cybersecurity.
But the environment matters.
A controlled laboratory or dedicated test environment provides significantly more freedom to perform technical validation than a live vessel operating critical systems.
A responsible methodology therefore separates:
- Passive assessment
- Configuration review
- Documentation review
- Controlled active assessment
- Laboratory testing
- Live vessel testing
Each level should have an appropriate authorization, safety assessment and testing procedure.
Common Ship OT Cybersecurity Mistakes
- Treating the ship as a normal corporate network.
- Focusing only on internet-facing systems.
- Ignoring IT and OT communication paths.
- Assuming an isolated OT network is permanently isolated.
- Ignoring vendor remote access.
- Running aggressive vulnerability scans against safety-critical equipment without proper authorization and validation.
- Relying only on CVSS scores.
- Ignoring operational consequences.
- Failing to maintain an accurate asset inventory.
- Ignoring legacy equipment.
- Failing to test recovery procedures.
- Treating cybersecurity as an IT-only responsibility.
How to Build a Ship OT Cybersecurity Program
GOVERNANCE
|
v
ASSET INVENTORY
|
v
NETWORK ARCHITECTURE
|
v
RISK ASSESSMENT
|
+----------+----------+
| |
v v
PROTECT DETECT
| |
+----------+----------+
|
v
RESPOND
|
v
RECOVER
|
v
CONTINUOUS REVIEW
This lifecycle reflects the broader maritime cyber risk management approach promoted by IMO rather than treating security as a single technical scan. [oai_citation:8‡International Maritime Organization](https://www.imo.org/en/ourwork/security/pages/cyber-security.aspx?utm_source=chatgpt.com)
The Most Important Question in Ship OT Security
A security assessment should not stop at:
“Is this system vulnerable?”
The better question is:
“If this system were compromised, what could the attacker reach, what physical process could be affected, and how would the vessel detect, respond and recover?”
That question connects cybersecurity evidence to operational risk.
Final Perspective
Ship OT cybersecurity is not simply about finding open ports or running a vulnerability scanner.
It is about understanding how technology supports the physical operation of a vessel.
Start with the assets.
Map the communication paths.
Understand the IT and OT boundaries.
Identify external and remote access.
Correlate vulnerabilities with actual architecture and operational context.
Then prioritize the risks that could genuinely affect the vessel, its crew, cargo, environment or operational continuity.
A vessel is not secure because it has a firewall. It is secure when its critical systems, communication paths and recovery capabilities have been understood, protected and continuously managed.
Need a Ship OT Cybersecurity Assessment?
Cautivra provides remote and evidence-based cybersecurity assessment for shipboard OT and connected maritime systems.
Depending on project scope, an assessment can review vessel architecture, OT asset inventories, network diagrams, remote access, external exposure, firewall configurations, vulnerability information, network captures and existing cybersecurity controls.
The objective is to identify meaningful security gaps, explain their operational relevance and provide practical remediation priorities.
Request a Ship OT Security Assessment
Frequently Asked Questions
What is ship OT cybersecurity?
Ship OT cybersecurity protects the computer-based systems used to monitor or control physical processes onboard a vessel. This can include propulsion, power, navigation, cargo and machinery systems, depending on the vessel architecture.
What is the difference between maritime IT and OT security?
Maritime IT security primarily protects information, business systems and computing infrastructure. OT security focuses on systems that monitor or control physical processes. In modern vessels, the two environments can be interconnected, making their security boundaries important to assess.
What systems should be included in a ship OT assessment?
The scope depends on the vessel, but it may include navigation systems, bridge systems, propulsion control, engine monitoring, power management, PLCs, HMIs, cargo systems, engineering workstations, remote access systems and other connected operational equipment.
Can Shodan be used for maritime cybersecurity?
Shodan can support authorized external attack-surface research by identifying publicly visible services and infrastructure. It cannot by itself establish that an internal ship OT system is vulnerable or accessible.
Can Nmap be used against ship OT?
Nmap can be useful in authorized and appropriately controlled environments. Active scanning of live OT systems requires additional caution because some operational equipment may not tolerate unexpected network traffic or probing.
Can ship OT cybersecurity be assessed remotely?
Yes. Remote assessment can review architecture diagrams, asset inventories, firewall configurations, remote access, external exposure, vulnerability information, logs and network captures. Physical validation requires appropriate access to an authorized test or operational environment.
What is IACS UR E26?
IACS UR E26 addresses cyber resilience of ships and focuses on the secure integration of IT and OT within the vessel environment. IACS describes its key areas as equipment identification, protection, attack detection, response and recovery.
What is IACS UR E27?
IACS UR E27 addresses cyber resilience of onboard systems and equipment, including security considerations for equipment and system interfaces.
Does IMO require ship cybersecurity?
IMO has established maritime cyber risk management guidance and adopted Resolution MSC.428(98), which calls for cyber risks to be appropriately addressed within existing Safety Management Systems. Specific regulatory obligations can depend on the vessel, flag state, classification requirements and applicable national regulations.